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Abstract
Machine learning architectures are readily available on the
web, but creating the high quality training data is costly. How-
ever, a pretrained model on a cloud service can be used to
generate labeled data to steal the model if the adversary can
obtain output labels for chosen inputs. To protect against these
attacks, it has been proposed to limit the information provided
to the adversary by omitting probability scores, significantly
impacting the utility of the provided service. In this work, we
illustrate how a service provider can still provide useful, albeit
misleading, class probability information, while significantly
limiting the success of the attack. Our defense forces the adver-
sary to discard the class probabilities, requiring significantly
more queries before they can train a model with comparable
performance. We evaluate several attack strategies, model ar-
chitectures, and hyperparameters under varying adversarial
models, and evaluate the efficacy of our defense against the
strongest adversary. Finally, we quantify the amount of noise
injected into the class probabilities to measure the loss in util-
ity, e.g., adding 1.26 nats per query on CIFAR-10 and 3.27
on MNIST. Our evaluation shows our defense can degrade
the accuracy of the stolen model at least 20%, or require up
to 64 times more queries while keeping the accuracy of the
protected model almost intact.
1 Introduction
The success of neural networks has resulted in many web
services based on them, including services providing APIs
to label input samples for small sums of money. Many state-
of-the-art neural network models are readily available in the
literature or online, and unlabeled data (e.g., images and
corpus) are also often abundant on the web. But labeling data
to train a machine learning model is expensive, difficult and
error-prone even for simple tasks (Ringger et al. 2008). It is
even more difficult for domains requiring expert knowledge
(e.g., coreference resolution in the medical domain). However,
once an adversary acquires enough labels using the web
service, the attacker can replicate the neural network and no
longer needs to pay for the service (Tramèr et al. 2016). For
example, current image classification services charge around
$1–$10 per 1,000 queries, depending on the sophistication
or customization of the model (Google ; Microsoft ; IBM ).
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Moreover, replicating neural networks greatly expands the
attack surface, allowing white-box attacks against black-box
services (Papernot et al. 2017).
In particular, we consider a scenario that an attacker uses
the probability values returned by the base model on the
cloud service to boost the model stealing process. The cloud
service often provide probability values to show confidence.
When stealing models, (Tramèr et al. 2016) claim that using
probabilities instead of labels alone reduces the number of
required samples by 50–100×. We also confirm that using
probabilities can improve the convergence, and also increases
the converged model accuracy in Section 4.1 and 4.4.
To mitigate this problem, we propose to add smart noise
in the output probability that maintains the output class la-
bel of the model not to harm the accuracy. We aim to force
the attacker to discard the probability and use labels only,
which is a lower bound of the optimal attack for an accuracy-
preserving defense. To evaluate the performance, we consider
two types of attacks. First, we identify and test an attack that
can replicate an unprotected model quickly.1 Our evaluation
considers diverse datasets, attack parameters, neural networks
architectures and domains (images and text), and shows that
our approach can degrade the stolen model accuracy by 20%
or more while keeping the protected model accuracy almost
intact. Second, we consider defense-aware attacks, includ-
ing exploiting the same defense layer, reversing the noise,
using a different loss function, and using only labels. With
the accuracy-preserving defense, the attacker can still get
correct labels by applying argmax to the probability vector,
and therefore using only labels is a lower bound of the best
attack, which is much slower to converge. We aim to force the
attacker to use this suboptimal attack by eliminating better
attacks and show diverse defense-aware attacks fail to achive
better accuracy than the lowerbound.
2 Related work
The problem of inferring secret model parameters by observ-
ing the output classification to a given set of inputs has been
recently studied. (Tramèr et al. 2016) claim that using high-
precision confidence values and class labels obtained from
a machine learning cloud service, their attack can steal the
1We observe that a defense-aware attack performs worse on an
unprotected model.
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base model of several types including decision trees, logistic
regression, support vector machines and simple neural net-
works. For simple parametric models such as logistic regres-
sion, they solve a linear system from the obtained probabili-
ties. For decision trees, they develop a path-finding algorithm
to exploit the confidence value as pseudo-identifiers for paths
in the tree to discover the tree structure. For neural networks,
they leverage a method we denote by Sample that uses a set
of samples and query a randomly drawn batch, and train the
network with the output from the base model. (Wang and
Gong 2018) also consider stealing a machine learning param-
eter, but their work is limited to the regularization parameter,
not the entire model.
(Papernot et al. 2017) proposed stealing a black-box
neural network model to generate adversarial examples.
They assume the attacker has a limited number of train-
ing data, and propose to use a Jacobian-based heuristic in
order to find examples defining the decision boundary of
the target model. We extend the analyses of Sample and
Jacobian Augmentation with five datasets, four neural net-
work architectures as well as other attack methods to leverage
in our defense evaluation. To our knowledge, this is the first
study mitigating such model stealing attacks.
Student-teacher models have been used to compress a so-
phisticated teacher machine learning model into a smaller
student model with less parameters (Bucila˘, Caruana, and
Niculescu-Mizil 2006; Romero et al. 2014). Using the out-
put probability vectors from the teacher to train the student,
we can obtain a similarly performing student model with far
less parameters. This paradigm focuses only on improving
the student model with less parameters, unlike our goal of
preventing it, and tries to leverage more information about
the teacher (white-box) to better train or design the student,
which is inapplicable in our cloud service scenario.
3 Methods
In this section, we propose an add-on layer that can be ap-
plied to most neural network classifiers to protect against
model stealing from cloud service APIs. This layer adds a
small controllable perturbation maximizing the loss of the
stolen model while preserving the accuracy. That is, instead
of attempting to detect an attack, we apply noise that has
little influence to normal users, but still degrades and slow
down the model stealing attack. An optimal defense should
provide utility to the service consumers, while providing no
measurable benefit to the adversary beyond a final label.
We consider neural networks that extract features from
the input data and aggregate them throughout the layers to
generate class probabilities of the input. Typically, the last
layer is an activation function producing probability values
ranging from 0 to 1 and sum to 1, given logits, the unbounded
vector from the previous layer. In most cases, the softmax
function without parameters is used. That is, most neural
network classifiers of K classes can be represented as y =
f(x) = σ(g(x)), mapping input x to output y, where g(·)
is a function to a K-dimensional real vector, and σ(·) is a
normalization function (e.g., softmax) mapping a vector to
K probability values summing to 1.
An attacker with samples X = {xi} can query a neural
network on the remote server (base model) to obtain the
corresponding pseudo-labels Y = {yi}, and train their own
neural network (stolen model). The completely replicated
network should have the minimum loss L with respect to Y ,
which is usually defined using the cross entropy loss function.
That is,
L(X,Y ) = −
∑
i
∑
j
yij log f(x
i)j (1)
where yij and f(x
i)j represent j-th dimension of yi and
f(xi), respectively.
In this setting, we propose to add noise to the server re-
sponse {yi} that results in a high loss so that the attacker’s
optimizer ill-trains the network. Toward this goal, we first
assume that the stolen model already perfectly replicated the
base model, and parameterize the possible perturbation of yi
with conditions to maximize loss L.
In particular, the perturbed probability vector yˆi should
have the following properties. First, the sum across the di-
mensions must be 1. Second, we should be able to control
the magnitude of the perturbation. Last, the accuracy should
be preserved, i.e., yˆik ≥ yˆij for j = 1, . . . ,K and k such that
yik ≥ yij . To this goal, we consider additive perturbation with
normalization: yˆij = α
i(yij − r(yij)) where αi is a sum-to-1
normalizer for yi, and r(yij) is the noise function we seek
with the following parameterization:
r(yij) = β(s(z
i
j)− 1/2) (2)
where s(·) is a sigmoid function, zij is a perturbation, and β
is a positive magnitude parameter; with a constraint yˆik ≥ yˆij
for j = 1, . . . ,K preserving the accuracy. Using a derivative
test, we can find L(x, yˆ) has critical points when zij → ± inf .
In particular, L(x, yˆ) is maximized when zik → inf for k
such that yik ≥ yij for j = 1, ... . . . ,K, and zij → − inf for j
with low yij .
Instead of directly setting zij to maximize the loss, we use
a heuristic approximation to + inf when yik is the largest
and − inf otherwise, not to completely lose the probability
values: zij = γs
−1(yij) where γ is a positive dataset and
model specific convergence parameter, and s−1(yij) is the
pseudo-logit of yij that amplifies the behavior of y
i
j and makes
the perturbation comparable to the original probability. With
this approximation, we obtain Reverse Sigmoid perturbation
r(yij):
r(yij) ≈ β(s(γs−1(yij))− 1/2) (3)
This function has a shape of flipped sigmoid function as
shown in Figure 1, and the final perturbed probability value
is computed as follows:
yˆij = α
i
(
yij − β(s(γs−1(yij))− 1/2)
)
(4)
This function has humps that prevent simple inversion impos-
sible as depicted in Figure 1.
The main advantage of using Reverse Sigmoid
s(γs−1(yij)) in r(y
i
j) is two-fold. First, we don’t com-
pletely lose the meaning of the probability values, in contrast
to always returning the same values for top-1 and bottom-1
classes. Second, this function form adds ambiguity that
prevents a simple inversion. As we can see in Figure 1, the
final deceptive probability curve has two yij values that
have the same yˆij in the range [0,
αiβ
2 ] and [α
i(1 − β2 ), 1],
except where the first derivative is zero, making the exact
inverse function impossible and the inversion difficult. The
adversary cannot attempt to select from each value because
it results in an exponential number of options, up to 2K
possibilities per sample. For the same reason, the network
cannot be replicated perfectly even if the attacker exploit
Reverse Sigmoid in the attacker’s model or leverage mean
squared errors instead of cross loss entropy, which we show
empirically in Section 4.4.
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Figure 1: Example Reverse Sigmoid and Sigmoid activation
functions.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the proposed defense method. For
this goal, we consider two types of attacks. We first identify
the best attack for an undefended model, including query gen-
eration, parameters, and underlying models in Section 4.1.
For an undefended model, we find that the best performing
attack designed for a defended model does not perform as
good as that for an undefended model. Then, we evaluate the
defense methods on five image datasets and one text dataset
with five measures using the identified attack in Section 4.2,
and we discuss relations of the base models and the stolen
models in Section 4.3. We further evaluate the defense against
possible attacks when the attacker knows more information
about the defense in Section 4.4, and show these attacks
cannot achieve better performance than using only labels,
which is a lower bound of the best attack for the accuracy-
preserving defense. Basic data augmentation (shift/flip) is
applied in all training (Ciregan, Meier, and Schmidhuber
2012). MobileNet (Howard et al. 2017) and Xception (Chol-
let 2017) are optimized with Adam optimizer (Kingma and
Ba 2014), AllConv is optimized with the vanilla stochastic
gradient descent as in its original paper (Springenberg et
al. 2014), and RMSProp (Hinton, Srivastava, and Swersky )
is used otherwise to achieve the best performance for each
individual model.
We use the following five measures to evaluate the perfor-
mance of attacks and defenses.
• Agreement: Top-1 model accuracy of the stolen model
treating the base model as ground truth.
• Cosine: The average cosine similarity of output probability
vectors of the stolen and the base models.
• MAE (Mean absolute error): The average absolute errors
of the predictions of the stolen and the base models per
class.
• KL-divergence: KL-divergence between the probabilities
of the stolen and the base models.
• Accuracy: The prediction accuracy.
The first four measures do not use labels of the test dataset,
and focus on the intrinsic model replicability. Accuracy fo-
cuses on the extrinsic performance on tasks.
We use six datasets including IMDB sentiment classi-
fication (Maas et al. 2011), MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998),
FASHION-MNIST (Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017), CIFAR-
10, and CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky 2009), and STL-10 (Coates,
Ng, and Lee 2011). These classification datasets cover differ-
ent degrees of difficulty, and a model for an easy dataset is
easier to attack and harder to defend as shown in Section 4.2.
If we can defend them, it’s likely we can defend larger mod-
els and sophisticated datasets as well. For the image datasets,
we randomly hold off 33% of the original training data, uni-
formly from each class, to assign a portion of them to the
attacker after removing the labels and the probability values.
Note that this partitioning will allow only 67% of the original
training data for the base model on the cloud, and result in
a small drop in model accuracy for each of the base models
compared to the state-of-the-art. For the text dataset, we split
the test data in the same way due to the small training data.
4.1 Threat Model and Attacks
For the evaluation, we consider the following adversarial
model. The adversary knows the architecture of the model
being attacked, has a given number of unlabeled input sam-
ples (# samples), and can send a fixed number of (adaptive)
queries to the base model to obtain labels and probability
values. We do not assume the adversary is computationally
bounded for training.
We compare the following attack strategies to generate
queries and use the response as the training data.
• Sample: The attacker has a certain number of data samples
in hand, and queries them to the base model.
• ArgmaxSample: Same as Sample, but this attack uses the
top-1 class label only.
• Random: The attacker does not rely on any existing data
samples, and instead generates uniform random queries.
The attacker knows the ranges and the dimensions of the
input values.
• Jacobian Augmentation: The attacker has a certain num-
ber of data samples, and generates more samples using the
Jacobian method (Papernot et al. 2017). The stolen model
is trained using the response from the base model for both
the data samples, and the generated samples. The trained
model is further used to generate more samples. We set
λ = 0.1 and substitute training epochs ρ = 40.
The attacks also use randomized image augmentation that
shifts, and/or flips images during the training2. As a neural
network is trained for multiple epochs, the same training
sample is used multiple times. Adding slight change to the
image in every epoch provides much better generalization
power, and results in better test accuracy (Ciregan, Meier,
and Schmidhuber 2012).
We compare these attacks with various parameters, identify
the attack most successful at replicating the base model, and
evaluate our defenses against the strongest attack. We use a
simple convolutional network, denoted by Simple, for both
the base and the stolen models: 64 3× 3 conv, 64 3× 3 conv,
2 × 2 max pooling, 128 3 × 3 conv, 128 3 × 3 conv, 2 × 2
max pooling, 256 dense, 256 dense, and softmax layers.
Query Generation The most limiting resource for an ad-
versary is real data samples to query the base model (e.g.,
medical records, employee faces). Therefore, we evaluate
the attacker methods on varying # samples first, and set at-
tacker budget to 50,000 queries, and training steps to 16,000
with 64-sized batch. Figure 2 shows the performance of the
three attack strategies against the number of samples on the
MNIST dataset. We can see that Sample attack performs best
for various # samples. Like all other attack methods, Sample
leverage data augmentation to generate more samples. Our
preliminary experiment showed that using data augmenta-
tion significantly improved the test accuracy (approx. 85%
increase with 150 samples). ArgmaxSample also steals the
model with high accuracy, but its replication is much slower
especially at the beginning. For example, with data augmen-
tation, Sample reaches 97% agreement with 300 samples, but
ArgmaxSample goes only up to 96% with 19200 samples
(≈ 64× samples).
The Jacobian augmentation is used to push samples to-
wards the boundaries of each class in the direction of greatest
increase in the loss function to generate samples defining the
decision boundary. When applied to the input image, it suc-
cessfully probes the classification boundary of the model, but
results in generating imperceptible perturbation to an image
so that the neural network misclassifies the input (Papernot et
al. 2016). Thus, using Jacobian generates adversarial exam-
ples that are misclassified by the base model (e.g., Figure 3
are all misclassified as indicated). Although they are useful
in adversarial example generation scenario (Papernot et al.
2017), leveraging these labels from the base model results in
teaching the replicated model the wrong classification.
On the other hand, although Random attack has high train-
ing accuracy, its performance on test data is poor, giving the
accuracy of random guess. Most of samples generated by
Random falls in one class, and this leads to train the repli-
cated model to predict just one class regardless the input.
This shows the importance having legitimate data samples
to query the model. Based on these results, we use Sample
attack, which can most accurately replicate the model in the
defense-unaware scenario.
2Flipping is not applied on the MNIST dataset.
Model Architecture The attacker has a choice of their own
models to train. We test Sample to train Simple model de-
scribed above, as well as MobileNet (Howard et al. 2017),
AllConv (Springenberg et al. 2014), and Xception (Chollet
2017) models. More complex models such ResNet (He et al.
2016) and Inception (Szegedy et al. 2016) are not applicable
to the test datasets we use due to the input image dimensions.
Figure 4 shows comparisons of performance regarding dif-
ferent replicated model architectures used.3 As we can expect,
the simplest model learns fastest. While approaches such as
Xception and MobileNet work well with larger data (Howard
et al. 2017; Chollet 2017), they are not suitable in a model
stealing scenario with relatively few samples. Also, we find
AllConv not only learns relatively fast, but also performs well
for all datasets. Therefore, we use AllConv throughout the
rest of the experiments. For the IMDB dataset, we use the
most popular approach using Bidirectional LSTM (Schuster
and Paliwal 1997).
4.2 Defense Evaluation
Now we compare defense methods against Sample attack
method with AllConv model. As a defense, we consider
adding one of the following perturbations to the output prob-
ability vector, where U(−1, 1) is uniform random noise be-
tween -1 to 1, and β, ρ and f are parameters.
• Uniform Random: βU(−1, 1).
• Uniform Random × Concave: βU(−1, 1) ×
1/e−
1
2 (y
i
j/ρ)
2
.
• Uniform Random × Convex: βU(−1, 1) ×(
1− 1/e− 12 (yij/ρ)2
)
.
• Ranking-preserving Uniform Random: Same as Uni-
form Random, but the ranking of output classes is pre-
served to maintain the accuracy.
• Sine: β sin(fyij).
• Reverse Sigmoid: a stretched and reversed sigmoid r(yij)
explained in this paper.
The goal of the defense is twofold: 1) prevent model repli-
cation (low stolen model S(M, defense) agreement), and 2)
retain the performance of the protected model (high protected
model P (M, defense) agreement). The best parameters for
the defense methods are searched using grid search to achieve
the highest cosine similarity to the original model with at
least 20% accuracy drop in stealing with attacker budget of
19200. When we cannot find parameters satisfying 20% accu-
racy drop in stealing, we instead choose the parameters with
the highest accuracy drop in stealing.
Figure 5 and Table 1 shows the experimental results. We
see the proposed Reverse Sigmoid defense consistently slows
down the replication process (Figure 5), and can drop the
stolen model agreement more than 20% for all tested datasets
(Table 1). Also, the protected models still have high agree-
ments. Using a sinusoidal wave noise does not protect the
3Note that the performance degradation is due to the use of only
two third of the original training data less the attacker portion.
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Figure 4: Agreement with the base model for various types of attacker model architectures.
model for all tested parameter combinations. The final pertur-
bation made by sine is small as the sine applied to each class
can interfere each other, and it is normalized to have only
small effect. While Uniform Random may look effective for
some datasets like FASHION MNIST and CIFAR-100, the
agreements of the protected models are not reliable. In case
of Ranking-preserving Uniform Random, we can achieve
the perfect agreements, but the effectiveness of the defense is
unpredictable (e.g., FASHION MNIST vs. CIFAR-10).
Table 2 shows the side effects of the Reverse Sigmoid
defense. The protected model accuracy is well maintained
because the defense tends not to change the labels if one class
is dominating. To measure how much noise is added to the
probability vectors, we use the average cosine similarity, the
mean absolute error per dimension, and KL-divergence of
the protected model and the base model outputs. In particular,
we see that the mean absolute error is less than 0.2 in most
datasets. This noise can be higher if the model prediction is
more confident. However, in this case, the decision is unlikely
to be affected in many applications.
4.3 Base Model Accuracy versus Reverse Sigmoid
Protection Effectiveness
Since we add noise to the confident classes, the output proba-
bility of a model can affect the performance of the Reverse
Sigmoid defense. To see this, we train different models on
CIFAR-10 dataset, resulting in different accuracies. Then,
we apply the Reverse Sigmoid protection, and try the attack
with AllConv. In Table 3, we see that if the original accuracy
(M accuracy) is higher, the defense is more effective (higher
accuracy drops). This is especially important because when
the accuracy of the original model is high, there is higher
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Figure 5: Agreement of stolen model with base model using different defense types.
Table 1: Agreements with 19200 queries. M : base model, S(·): stolen model, P (·): protected model.
Dataset MNIST FASHION MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 STL-10 IMDB
S(M) 0.93 0.95 0.82 0.48 0.62 0.84
P (M,Reverse Sigmoid) 0.99 y
-0.31
0.99 y
-0.29
0.85 y
-0.45
1.00 y
-0.98
0.99 y
-0.62
1.00 y
-0.40
S(M,Reverse Sigmoid) 0.68 0.70 0.40 0.02 0.37 0.60
P (M,Uniform Random) 0.60 y
+0.38
0.56 y
-0.47
0.79 y
-0.13
0.82 y
-0.80
0.55 y
-0.43
0.72 y
-0.12
S(M,Uniform Random) 0.98 0.09 0.66 0.02 0.12 0.60
P (M,Uniform Random × Concave) 0.88 y
+0.05
0.86 y
+0.05
0.69 y
-0.15
0.82 y
-0.80
0.92 y
-0.35
0.72 y
-0.13
S(M,Uniform Random × Concave) 0.93 0.91 0.54 0.02 0.57 0.59
P (M,Uniform Random × Convex) 0.89 y
+0.04
0.86 y
+0.04
0.70 y
-0.12
0.82 y
-0.80
0.98 y
-0.39
0.72 y
-0.12
S(M,Uniform Random × Convex) 0.93 0.90 0.58 0.02 0.59 0.60
P (M,Ranking-preserving Uniform Random) 1.00 y
-0.13
1.00 y
-0.05
1.00 y
-0.54
1.00 y
-0.77
1.00 y
-0.45
1.00 y
-0.24
S(M,Ranking-pre. Uniform Random) 0.87 0.95 0.46 0.23 0.55 0.76
P (M, Sine) 0.89 y
+0.03
0.91 y
-0.02
0.77 y
-0.03
0.56 y
-0.08
0.61 y
+0.03
0.84 y
-0.04
S(M, Sine) 0.92 0.89 0.74 0.48 0.64 0.80
demand of protection.
4.4 Robustness of Reverse Sigmoid against
Defense-aware Attack
We test the robustness of the Reverse Sigmoid defense when
the attacker knows more information on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Attack using the same defense layer If the defense and
the parameters get to be known by the attacker, the attacker
can use exactly the same defense layer in their model. The Re-
verse Sigmoid defense is not a standard neural network layer,
and have ambiguity that multiple logit values are mapped to
the same probability by the defense layer. This essentially
propagates wrong gradient values to the model, degrading
the stealing process as resulted in Table 4.
Attack using the mean-squared-error loss function To
replicate the model output more precisely, the attacker may
use the mean-squared-error (MSE) loss function instead of
the more common cross entropy loss function which the
Reverse Sigmoid defense is designed for. However, for the
same reason as the attack using the same defense layer, this
loss function is not free from the ambiguity, and still shows
poor performance as shown in Table 4.
Attack using an inversion mapping We now evaluate the
adversary’s ability to recover the original unprotected class
probabilities from the protected model assuming they have
full knowledge of the parameters of the protection, i.e., yi, yˆi
pairs. We compute a linear regression of the class probabili-
ties of the base model M and the protected model P , and use
the regression and normalization to attempt to recover the un-
protected probabilities. In our second attack, we use a simple
multilayer perceptron (MLP) model with two hidden layers
(5×K and 3×K neurons), and K input and output values.
The model is trained on 16,670 real output pairs from M and
P (yi, yˆi pairs) and optimizing over the loss KL(Pˆ ,M). We
compute the KL divergence of both the recovered probability
values (Pˆ ) and the protected probability values (P ) against
the unprotected model in Figure 7, where a perfect attack
corresponds to KL(Pˆ ,M) = 0. It is clear to see that both
attacks are able to recover some of the information lost by
Table 2: Effects of Reverse Sigmoid defense. M : base model, P : protected model, S(P ): stolen model from P .
Dataset M acc. P acc. S(P ) acc. Cos(P ,M ) MAE(P ,M ) KL-div(P ,M )
MNIST 0.99 0.99 0.68 0.41 0.17 3.27
FASHION MNIST 0.87 0.87 0.66 0.47 0.16 1.72
CIFAR-10 0.75 0.73 0.36 0.61 0.48 1.26
CIFAR-100 0.43 0.43 0.02 0.33 0.02 2.30
STL-10 0.51 0.51 0.31 0.74 0.16 2.20
IMDB 0.81 0.81 0.60 0.80 0.39 0.48
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Figure 6: Performance difference of model stealing using all class probabilities vs. only the top-1 label on CIFAR-10.
Table 3: Base model and stealing on CIFAR-10
Model M acc. P acc. S acc. Acc. drop
AllConv 0.75 0.73 0.36 0.37
Simple 0.70 0.69 0.50 0.19
Xception 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.13
MobileNet 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.01
Figure 7: Recovering unprotected class probabilities using
linear regression and MLP
the attack, but neither is able to fully recover the unprotected
model output. In the linear regression model, a fixed amount
of information is recovered, while the MLP is able to recover
more information. However the attack’s capability dimin-
ishes with the amount of noise that was added to the sample.
Finally, we find the MLP attack does not increase the stolen
model agreement, as shown in Table 4.
Attack using labels only (ArgmaxSample) As shown in
Section 4.1, using argmax requires a larger budget than at-
tacks using the probabilities (≈ 64× queries compared to
Table 4: Agreements of attack variants
Attack Agree.
Same Defense Layer 0.10
MSE Loss 0.18
Inversion (MLP) 0.22
Argmax 0.78
Sample). However, the attacker can simply take the top-1
class of the result which is usually correct. This approach
achieves much better replication of a defended model given
enough budget as shown in Table 4. Still, by forcing the at-
tacker to discard probability values, the attacker has to use 4×
as many queries in our evaluation on CIFAR-10 dataset. That
is, using probability values requires 4800 queries to reach
0.7813 agreement, but without probability values, 19200
queries have to be used to reach the same agreement. Besides
the agreement, we can see lower cosine similarity and high
KL-divergence, Figure 6, even with 19200 queries, meaning
that while top-1 decision is quickly learned, the trait of the
network including output distributions takes more queries to
replicate. This difference can limit the generalization power,
and it can be especially important if the attacker further wants
to use the model for adversarial example generation (Paper-
not et al. 2017). Finally, note that this is a degenerate attack
that applies to any defense that maintains top-1 accuracy.
5 Conclusion
Neural networks are becoming one of the key assets of an
enterprise, but they are vulnerable to stealing attacks. We
proposed a method that can be applied to wide variety of
neural network models and evaluated the protection perfor-
mance over five datasets, four neural network architectures,
and diverse threat models and attack parameters. Our ap-
proach either prevented the stealing entirely or slowed down
the stealing process up to 64× in the worst case when the
attacker knows the defense.
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